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Economists often use event study methodology to evaluate the impact of new reg-
ulations on ﬁrms before there is enough data to empirically estimate the eﬀects. This
research investigates the degree to which event study methodology can provide useful
information in this regard by studying how accurately markets predict the actual ben-
eﬁts associated with a new law. Utilizing a unique change in U.S. trade law, I compare
the beneﬁts predicted by event study methodology with the actual beneﬁts accruing
to individual ﬁrms. The results indicate that estimates from event study methodology
are poor predictors of the true eﬀect of new policies.
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11 Introduction
Economists are often asked to evaluate the impact of a new set of regulations on particular
industries well before there is enough data to empirically estimate the eﬀects. One method
that economists have used to tackle this challenge in the past is the event study, which
assumes that in an eﬃcient market security prices fully reﬂect all available information and
adjust immediately to new information.1 Therefore, the degree to which a new policy will
impact a given ﬁrm should be reﬂected in the change in the ﬁrm’s security price at the time
the new policy was ﬁrst anticipated.
Although researchers using event study methodology typically acknowledge the diﬃculties
they face in estimating an event study, few consider the degree to which markets can correctly
anticipate the impact of a new policy on a ﬁrm. I study in this research whether event studies
can provide useful information on the eﬀect of a particular policy change on a ﬁrm given
that investors typically have extremely limited ability to anticipate the true impact of the
policy. In other words, while event studies may be able to reveal how investors think a policy
will impact a ﬁrm, these expectations may be poor predictors of the true impact.
A change in U.S. antidumping law enacted in 2000 known as the Byrd Amendment
provides a unique opportunity to study the degree to which markets are able to correctly
anticipate the ﬁnancial rewards from new policies.2 Prior to the Byrd Amendment, the
tariﬀ revenue collected due to successful antidumping petitions was deposited in the U.S.
treasury. The Byrd Amendment, however, requires the U.S. Customs Service to distribute
these antidumping duties to ﬁrms that supported the original petition associated with the
duties. Passage of the Byrd Amendment came as a complete surprise to most ﬁrms and
analysts and provided new information on the future revenue stream of beneﬁciary ﬁrms not
previously incorporated in security prices; thus, event study methodology should be able to
estimate the degree to which investors expected ﬁrms to beneﬁt from the new law. Because
the U.S. Customs Service is required to report each year the amount of money distributed
under the Byrd Amendment to individual ﬁrms, this is one of the few laws in which the exact
2monetary beneﬁts realized by each ﬁrm due to the law is public information.3 Thus, the
law provides the perfect opportunity to study the extent to which markets can accurately
estimate the eﬀect of new regulations.
The results suggest that investor’s expectations regarding the impact of the Byrd Amend-
ment on U.S. ﬁrms were inaccurate, although perhaps not to as great a degree as one might
expect. For example, investor’s anticipated a signiﬁcant, positive impact of the Byrd Amend-
ment on only ﬁve of the 41 public companies that collected rewards under the law in 2001.
However, this result is not surprising given that many of these ﬁrms received only modest
monetary beneﬁts under the new law, particularly when compared to the ﬁrm’s total annual
revenue. Moreover, regression results indicate that passage of the law had a greater impact
on the returns of ﬁrms in which Byrd receipts account for a large share of total revenue,
as one would expect if investors could accurately predict the impact of the law. However,
the results also indicate that investors signiﬁcantly overestimated the impact of the Byrd
Amendment on a subset of ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I present a brief review of the
legislative history of the Byrd Amendment and the monetary rewards that ﬁrm’s have been
awarded under the law. Section [3] discusses event studies in general and the multivariate
regression methodology used in this particular event study. Section [4] analyzes the results
from the event study, and speciﬁcally investigates whether those ﬁrms that investors expected
to realize gains under the Byrd Amendment beneﬁted as much as anticipated. Finally,
Section [5] concludes.
2 The Byrd Amendment
As noted above, the goal of this research is to compare the beneﬁts investors anticipated
ﬁrms getting from the Byrd Amendment with the increase in proﬁts these ﬁrms actually
realized under the new law. To accomplish this task, I utilize event study methodology
which exploits the fact that if market participants are rational, the anticipated beneﬁts of
3particular policy change will be reﬂected immediately in the security prices of the beneﬁciary
ﬁrms. In other words, the anticipated impact of the law can be measured by examining
security prices surrounding the event. If market participants have previously anticipated a
policy change, then its impact will already be embedded in the security price and event study
methodology will be ineﬀective. However, I argue in this section that passage of the Byrd
Amendment was completely unanticipated, thus the expected increase in proﬁts should be
reﬂected in the change in security prices in the days following passage of the law.4
The “Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act of 1999,” was introduced in both the
House and Senate in March of 1999, and then referred to committees with oversight over
international trade matters where it languished for nearly two years. Later in the Fall of 2000,
Congress worked furiously to complete the agriculture appropriations bill prior to the end of
the ﬁscal year. When conferees met on October 3 to resolve diﬀerences between the House
and Senate versions of this appropriations bill, Senator Robert Byrd proposed to include
the “Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act.” The new language, now known as the
Byrd Amendment, was incorporated into the agricultural appropriations bill by a vote of 7
to 6. Traditionally, conference reports are passed with minimal debate and no amendments,
and the 2001 agriculture appropriations bill with the Byrd Amendment was no exception.
Following its passage, the Byrd Amendment was strongly criticized by U.S. importers and
exporters, as well as its leading trading partners. The World Trade Organization ruled in
September 2002 that the law violates the international agreement on subsidies and directed
the United States to abolish the law. There are currently multiple bills pending before
Congress that would repeal the Byrd Amendment, although it is unclear when action on
these bills will be taken.
Most analysts knew from the beginning that the long-term viability of the Byrd Amend-
ment was questionable given U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization. However,
given the length of the WTO’s dispute settlement process it was equally clear that some ﬁrm’s
would reap signiﬁcant rewards from the bill’s passage, at least temporarily. Moreover, the
method in which Byrd Amendment money is distributed is extremely transparent. Any ﬁrm
4that supported the initial antidumping petition can submit a list of “qualiﬁed expenditures”
to the U.S. Customs service.5 Antidumping duty revenue is then distributed to the eligible
ﬁrms proportionately to each ﬁrm’s qualiﬁed expenditures. Therefore, investors could the-
oretically estimate the amount of antidumping duty revenue that would be collected in the
ﬁrst year of the Byrd Amendment’s existence as well as each ﬁrm’s approximate share of
this revenue.
In 2001, the ﬁrst year of the Byrd Amendment’s existence, Customs distributed $206.9
million to 136 ﬁrms. The value of individual awards ranged from hundreds of dollars to more
than $60 million. Of the total value distributed, 41 public companies collected $94.8 million.
As can be seen in Table [1], the leading public beneﬁciaries include the Timkem Company,
Lancaster Colony Corporation, and Tomkins PLC.
3 Empirical Methods
Event studies allow one to determine the impact of an unexpected economic or policy
change on the value of a subset of ﬁrms by measuring the abnormal returns that accrue
to those ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial market place during the “event window.” In this research,
I assume that the event window includes Te days surrounding October 3, 2000, the day
the Byrd Amendment was included in the Agriculture Appropriation bill, thus ensuring its
passage.
Event studies often estimate the abnormal return associated with a particular event using
the residuals from a market model, which assumes that the return to ﬁrm i is linearly related
to the return of a market portfolio. However, the basic market model assumes that these
residuals are independent and identically distributed, which is unlikely to be the case if the
event occurs during the same calendar time period for all ﬁrms in the sample. Instead, I
utilize the multivariate regression model (MVRM) to calculate the abnormal return to ﬁrm
i.6 In this model, the return for each security i in period t is deﬁned as:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + Σ
Te
d=1Ditdγid + it
5where Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on security i and the market portfolio, βi is the
systematic risk of security i, and it is a zero-mean error with a constant variance of σ2
i.
The variable Ditd is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the dth day of the event window
and zero otherwise. The parameter γid thus captures the abnormal return accruing to ﬁrm
i on day d of the event window. Given the parameter estimates, I estimate the cumulative













where I is a Te by Te identity matrix, Xi and Xie are the matrices of the explanatory variables
for ﬁrm i over the estimation period and the event period, respectively. Speciﬁcally, both
matrices include a column vector of ones for the constant term, the return to the market
portfolio Rm, and the dummy variables for the event window. Using the delta method, one
can compute the variance of the cumulative abnormal returns as the sum of the variances of
the individual day abnormal return plus twice the sum of their covariances or









where τ is a Te by 1 unit vector.
The parameters for each of the N ﬁrms, (αi,βi,γid), are estimated jointly using gener-
alized least squares (GLS). Although the estimates and standard errors for the individual
ﬁrm’s cumulative abnormal returns will be identical to the results obtained using ordinary
least squares, the GLS estimates will allow for testing of two joint hypotheses. I ﬁrst test
whether the average abnormal return during the event period surrounding passage of the
Byrd Amendment is zero, or 1
NΣiCARi = 0. Next I test whether the abnormal returns
during the event period are equal to zero for all ﬁrms, CARi = 0 ∀ i. Both hypotheses can




(c − Cb β)0(C[X0(Σ−1 ⊗ I)X]−1C0)−1(c − C0b β)
(R − Xb β)0(Σ−1 ⊗ I)(R − X0b β)
.
6In this equation, NT is the number of ﬁrms multiplied by the T days in the estimation
period, NK is the number of ﬁrms multiplied by the K explanatory variables, I is a T by T
identify matrix, Σ is an N by N covariance matrix, b β is the NK by 1 vector of parameter
estimates, X is a NT by NK block diagonal matrix of explanatory variables, and R is the
NK by 1 vector of returns. The term Q is the number of restrictions tested in the system;
there is one restriction in the ﬁrst hypothesis and N restrictions in the second hypothesis.
To complete construction of the test statistic, c is a vector of zeros of length Q, and C is
a matrix with Q rows that aggregate the abnormal returns. The test statistic has an F
distribution with Q and NT − NK degrees of freedom if the null hypothesis is true. Note
that both hypotheses imply that the passage of the Byrd Amendment had no inﬂuence on
the returns to the ﬁrms in the data sample.
This research utilizes ﬁrm-level stock return data from the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) database for those public ﬁrms that received Byrd Amendment revenue in
2001, or 41 ﬁrms. The value weighted index of all securities included in the CRSP database
is used as a proxy for returns on the market portfolio. The estimation period includes 226
market days prior to the inclusion of the Byrd Amendment in the Agricultural Appropriations
Bill and the three market days including and following the day of the amendment’s inclusion
in the bill. I deﬁne the event window as two market days prior to inclusion of the Byrd
Amendment in the appropriations bill through two days after the inclusion.
4 Results
Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns for each ﬁrm in the data sample are pre-
sented in Table [1]. Estimates suggest that only six of the 41 public ﬁrms in the data sample
had signiﬁcant, positive abnormal returns, which ranged from 12.5 percent to 21.3 percent.
The abnormal returns for all other ﬁrms proved insigniﬁcant. Interestingly, those ﬁrms with
signiﬁcant abnormal returns do not appear to be correlated with those ﬁrms that received
the most money under the Byrd Amendment in 2001. For example, of the leading ﬁve bene-
7ﬁciaries in the data sample only one, the American Italian Pasta Company, had signiﬁcant,
positive returns. Moreover, the simple correlation coeﬃcient between the cumulative ab-
normal returns and the total 2001 Byrd disbursements is -0.006, suggesting that abnormal
returns for beneﬁciaries decreased with the amount of money collected by the ﬁrm under the
new law.
Based on these results, it is unsurprising that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
average cumulative abnormal return for the ﬁrms in the sample is equal to zero. However,
I do reject the null hypothesis that all ﬁrms in the sample have zero abnormal returns,
suggesting that investors believed that at least a subset of ﬁrms would reap signiﬁcant gains
from the Byrd Amendment.7
Further analysis of the results suggest that investors may have overestimated the impact
of the Byrd Amendment on those ﬁrms with signiﬁcant, positive abnormal returns. The
ﬁrms with signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal returns are listed in Table [2]. The estimated
increases in returns far outweigh the approximate increases in revenue that occurred under
the Byrd Amendment. For example, estimates suggest that investors expected the value
of American Italian Pasta Company to increase 13.3 percent while the actual increase in
revenue in 2001 was 1.8 percent. The market returns of other ﬁrms exceeded the actual
returns by even greater margins. The high returns could be a reﬂection of a future stream of
revenues investor’s expected ﬁrms to earn under the Byrd Amendment either due to future
antidumping petitions or greater revenue collection.
To further analyze the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns, I regress the ab-
normal returns on the ratio of 2001 Byrd Revenue to the ﬁrm’s net sales in 2000, as well
as net sales and a dummy variable for steel producers. Because the steel industry has ac-
counted for such a large share of antidumping petitions over the past 20 years, one might
expect investor’s to anticipate that the Byrd Amendment would have a larger impact on
steel-producing ﬁrms than others. The results from the regression are presented in Table [3].
The results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of Byrd
Revenue in net sales results in a 3.8 percentage point anticipated increase in the value of
8the ﬁrm. Although it appears that investor’s correctly anticipate which ﬁrms would beneﬁt
more from the Byrd Amendment than others, they severely overestimated the total impact
of the law. Once again, this could represent investor’s anticipation that ﬁrms would earn a
higher stream of revenue in future years under the Byrd Amendment. However, given the
uncertainty surrounding the future viability of the Byrd Amendment I would expect the
impact on the ﬁrm to be much less than the 2001 Byrd receipts once investor’s take into
account the probability that the law would be overturned in future years. The steel dummy
variable proved insigniﬁcant in the regression, but abnormal returns increased with the total
size of the ﬁrm.8
5 Conclusion
Although economists often attempt to analyze the impact of new laws on ﬁrms using event
study methodology, it is questionable that investors have enough knowledge to estimate the
eﬀects of these laws and even ex post their impact is often quite uncertain. This study
suggests that while investors correctly anticipated that most ﬁrms would gain little from
passage of the Byrd Amendment they signiﬁcantly overestimated the returns accruing to
some ﬁrms due to the law and failed to recognize that other ﬁrms would reap rewards. As
a result, while event studies may be able to tell economists something about how investors
think a policy will impact a ﬁrm, the results are poor predictors of the true impact of new
policies.
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10Table 1
Public Companies Beneﬁtting from the Byrd Amendment, 2001
Byrd Dispursements Cumulative
Firm (thousands) Abnormal Return t-statistic
The Timken Company 30,977.4 -0.0079 -0.1584
Lancaster Colony Corp. 15,600.0 0.0188 0.2661
Tomkins PLC 8,361.3 -0.0039 -0.0599
American Italian Pasta Company 7,659.2 0.1334* 2.1742
Micron Technology 5,194.3 -0.1672 -1.6399
Bethlehem Steel 4,265.0 -0.0829 -1.0952
AK Steel Holding Corp. 3,716.4 0.0239 0.2970
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. 3,019.0 0.1235* 2.1355
Carpenter Technology Corp. 2,787.3 0.0094 0.1680
Olin Corp. 2,621.8 0.0307 0.4246
United States Steel Corp. 2,312.8 0.0426 0.7774
Allegheny Technologies Inc. 2,070.9 0.0192 0.3319
LTV Corp. 865.2 0.2134* 2.3897
Tyco International Ltd. 860.7 0.0457 0.5657
Archer Daniels Midland Co. 732.4 0.1103* 2.0938
Dana Corp. 607.1 0.0392 0.7053
Illinois Tool Works Inc. 441.3 0.0796 1.5108
BorgWarner Inc. 433.9 0.1251* 2.9335
3M Co. 413.7 0.0305 0.6288
FMC Corp. 405.2 0.0075 0.1578
National Steel Corp. 280.8 0.0665 0.8453
Dixon Ticonderoga Co. 252.7 -0.0994 -0.9692
Continued on Next Page...
11Table1–Continued
Byrd Dispursements Cumulative
Firm (thousands) Abnormal Return t-statistic
Trinity Industries Inc. 190.4 0.0427 0.9409
Synalloy Corp. 130.3 0.0249 0.3096
Federal-Mogul Corp. 107.5 -0.1136 -1.3850
Fortune Brands Inc. 76.4 -0.0022 -0.0423
Newell Rubbermaid Inc. 71.0 0.0259 0.3886
Lone Star Technologies Inc. 65.2 -0.0283 -0.3624
IPSCO 51.9 0.0065 0.1122
Shaw Group Inc. 42.3 -0.0858 -1.0616
Northwest Pipe Co. 24.3 -0.0033 -0.0516
Wellman Inc. 13.4 0.0680 1.0641
Alexander and Baldwin Inc. 8.1 -0.0533 -0.9926
Texas Industries Inc. 1.9 0.1381* 2.8407
Elkem ASA 1.3 -0.0120 -0.1086
Nucor Corp. 1.0 0.0428 0.7755
Birmingham Steel Corp. 1.0 -0.0528 -0.4051
Commerical Metals Co. 0.7 -0.0162 -0.3818
Planar Systems Inc. 0.3 -0.1167 -0.9317
Maverick Tube Inc. 0.2 -0.0399 -0.4123
NS Group Inc. 0.1 -0.1292 -1.3408
* indicates those CARS signiﬁcant at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
12Table 2
Firms with Signiﬁcant Abnormal Returns
Cumulative 2001 Byrd Receipts as
Firm Abnormal Return Share of 2000 Net Sales (percent)
American Italian Pasta Company 0.1334 3.078
Archer Daniels Midland Co. 0.1103 0.006
BorgWarner Inc. 0.1251 0.016
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. 0.1235 0.010
LTV Corp. 0.2134 0.018
Texas Industries Inc. 0.1381 0.000
Table 3
Determinants of the Cumulative Abnormal Return
Variable Parameter Estimate t-statistic
Byrd Share of Net Sales 3.8328** 1.7712
Steel 0.0195 0.6990
2000 Net Sales (Billions) 0.0041* 2.3440
Parameter estimate from a constant not reported. *,** indicate those parameters signif-
icant at the 5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
13Endnotes
1For examples of how this method has been used to estimate the impact of new trade
agreements see Thompson (1993) and Mutti, Sampson and Yeung (2000). Similarly, Harti-
gan, Kamma, and Perry (1989) use event study methodology to estimate the impact of the
imposition of antidumping duties on ﬁrms.
2U.S. antidumping law allows ﬁrms to request that the U.S. government impose duties on
products from speciﬁc foreign countries because the unfairly low priced products are causing
injury to domestic ﬁrms.
3The beneﬁts accruing to the ﬁrm from the antidumping protection itself was not changed
by the law.
4See Liebman and Reynolds (2005) for a more complete description of the passage of the
Byrd Amendment.
5Qualiﬁed expenditures include money spent on manufacturing facilities, raw materials,
personnel training, equipment, and research and development.
6See Binder (1985a), Binder (1985b) and Thompson (1993) for further discussion of the
MVRM.
7Speciﬁcally, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the average cumulative abnor-
mal return is zero is 0.30, while the test statistic for the null hypothesis that cumulative
abnormal return for all ﬁrms is zero is 1.59.
8Because the distribution of Byrd revenue tends to be proportional to ﬁrm size, the latter
result may be due to the fact that investors overestimated the total amount of Byrd revenue
that would be distributed in 2001.
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